Showing posts with label dispositifs du pouvoir. Show all posts
Showing posts with label dispositifs du pouvoir. Show all posts

Thursday, October 1, 2020

Begone, before somebody drops a house on you, too


There are basically two ways of overthrowing a reasonably established government: through violence or the threat of violence—the continuum from coup d'état to revolution in which one power is overwhelmed and replaced by another; and through the Machtübergreifung, as Hitler called it, the "snatching over" of the existing power apparatus and then transforming it according to existing forms. I don't think it gets sufficiently recognized that Hitler, or Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, didn't exactly break any laws in their accessions to absolute power (except to the extent that they used law-breaking ascribed to their enemies, the Reichstag fire that provided Hitler with his excuse to declare an entirely legal emergency, the apparent terrorism of the apartment-house bombings crisis that Putin was charged by Yeltsin with managing, which made the otherwise unknown vice president a national figure who could win an election). Hitler's brownshirt thugs didn't play a role in pushing him into the chancellery; that was the conservative aristocrat politicians, Field Marshal von Hindenburg and Erbsälzer Franz von Papen (the title, "hereditary salt maker", dates to the 13th century, when the Papens were one of 48 families of Werl in the Westphalian Basin entrusted with the monopoly on mining the local salt), who found him more sympatisch than the Social Democrats. Putin spent 12 years shoring up his position by legal means before he began having the proper authorities rewrite the law to give him a vehicle for exercising permanent power.

And why did Putin have Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya murdered in 2004 and 2006? And what were Hitler's brownshirts for? To make them look like strongmen as they achieved their aims in a less risky way, as Teri Kanefield writes:

Because being overestimated is how strongmen and wannabe strongmen appear invincible. It makes them feared and respected. It elevates their stature, which gives them power.

The revolutionary and the coup artist seize power, directly, because they have power. The Machtübergreifer bashes his way into the power that is there by being a conman, convincing you he has the power, bluffing and shouting, with more lawyers than thugs, asserting the legality of what he's doing. How many times, indeed, have you heard Trump or his agents explaining some action by claiming that he's "allowed" to do whatever it is, evading the question of what he's hoping to accomplish?

Trump loves you to see the kind of shit he can get away with, but he's pretty careful, in fact, to wrap it in legalisms, often bogus, but enough to keep him looking as if he cared. From the first day in office, when he showed us how he could force his press secretary to tell a ridiculous lie about how many people were on the Mall, he was also getting some henchman of his to get somebody in the GSA to reverse the ruling that Trump was not entitled to hold the lease on the Old Post Office building he was operating as a hotel, in the interregnum between administrators.

And when he and Sessions and Miller decided to contravene US and international law by refusing to hear asylum claims from Central American migrants, they didn't simply do it: they created an entirely new interpretation of the law (section 1325 of the Immigration and Nationality Act), which criminalizes crossing the US border at an undesignated location, applying it to asylum seekers for the first time, allowing the Border Patrol to throw them into criminal detention and herd their children into concentration camps.

When courts stopped Trump from doing the things he wanted to do—banning Muslims from entering the country, building the border wall on the Pentagon's dime, eliminating the DACA program, and so on—he obeyed the judges, but sent his people back to the drawing board to come up with another way of doing it, or allow him to claim he'd done it. The final version of the Muslim ban wasn't a Muslim ban at all, just a pointless difficulty imposed on an almost random selection of people from "shithole" countries, but it looked to supporters and opponents as if he'd shown he had the power to get his way regardless. They're still trying to curtail the census, they're still trying to cripple the Postal Service, but they don't just march in and bash a few heads; they always deploy the lawyers, and try to wear their enemies down. 

Which is why I can't quit insisting that he can't overturn the election, meaning, precisely, that he doesn't have the power—unless we give it to him.






I might add it would be nice to remember how ceaselessly Trump has insulted those people, and how ceaselessly he's mocked their power. If you want to foment a real coup, of course, you don't alienate the military or the premier national law enforcement agency, but even if it's just a bogus coup you shouldn't think you can count on them just because they love their hierarchy. The Pentagon publicly rejected Trump's idea of deploying active duty servicemen in quelling the George Floyd protests in Lafayette Square and elsewhere, a national guardsman denounced the propaganda version of how the Lafayette Square event was handled, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt compelled to apologize for putting himself in a position where it looked as if he was taking Trump's political side; and the brass have been sending out signals just this week that they're not prepared to be used in the election:

Several Pentagon officials said there could be resignations among many of Mr. Trump’s senior generals, starting at the top with General Milley, should troops be ordered into the streets at the time of the election.

The Air Force chief of staff, Gen. Charles Q. Brown, the officials said, would also be unlikely to carry out those orders. In the days after the killing of Mr. Floyd in police custody, General Brown released an extraordinary video in which he spoke in starkly personal terms about his experience as a Black man in America, his unequal treatment in the armed forces and the protests that gripped the country.






That's the main thing. His army of pudgy incels and superannuated bikers and DHS goons can't stop us from counting the votes, and I don't think when it comes down to it the Supreme Court can either. We have to say, "Rubbish, you have no power over me!" 


Saturday, April 7, 2018

Power Down

Adults-only event at Legoland, Tempe, AZ, via TempeTourism.

Shorter David Brooks, "The New Power Structure", New York Times. 5 April 2018:


Shorter in the first place because it's missing the obligatory opening four paragraphs in which Brooks pretends that he is writing an opinion column rather than a publisher blurb for New Power: How Power Works in Our Hyperconnected World—And How To Make It Work For You, which was released on Tuesday, and tries to suggest that he's seen some other inferior "windows into this new world" to compare this one to:

Friday, August 4, 2017

Acts of Defiance

Colombian Amazon, via Lugares Colombianos.

Funny detail about the extent to which General Kelly is moving to take control over the president:

(Should have been "told".)

The official explanation is that Kelly wants to control the quality of the information the president gets—less Breitbart and more Daily Briefing, which sounds like an absolutely good enough idea in its own right, but it also seems like a serious power play in more ways than one. First, it's an effort to stop Trump from making screaming phone calls, or presumably at least some of the tweets—an effort to control him, in respect to behaviors other minders haven't been able to temper. Then, it's a way of limiting the influence of certain staffers, like Bannon, who have long gotten attention from Trump in this way, with the inflammatory clipping (I took a detailed look at one case, the time Trump "found out" that Obama had had his "wires tapped" in Trump Tower, in March). And lastly it's a way of taking charge of the president's own inclinations, like putting him on a diet, infantilizing him, or treating him as an invalid (as Mrs. Wilson did to Woodrow after his 1919 stroke—he really was an invalid, of course, but Trump really is infantile in important respects).

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

Airborne Elephant Watch: Egypt


And it's time for another of our irregularly scheduled discussions of things that are undreamt of in Thomas Friedman's philosophy or, as his next book is likely to call them, Flying Elephants.
From Squidoo.com.
Today's case starts with the Egyptian minister of planning and international cooperation, and an old pal of Suzanne Mubarak's, Fayza Abul Naga, who is said to be the person mainly responsible [jump]

Sunday, December 18, 2011

Do as I say--and next time try to let me know what I say in advance

Terrific example of the Thug Rule according to which if the Leader can't stop his thugs from doing what he wants them not to do, then he has to pretend he wants them to do it:

Yesterday, as soon as the payroll-tax holiday extension bill passed the Senate, Speaker Boehner was on a conference call begging Republican House members to vote for it, but they turned him down; so today on Meet the Press? He doesn't want them to vote for it at all, and I guess he never did!
"It's pretty clear that I and our members oppose the Senate bill. It's only for two months," Boehner said, adding this was "kicking the can down the road."

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Is America really Pakistan?

While our president was going around last May making nice about all those Arab revolutionaries bringing their governments down, guess what the Pentagon was up to? According to closely reasoned and evidenced reporting from Nick Turse at TomDispatch,
[a]s state security forces across the region cracked down on democratic dissent, the Pentagon also repeatedly dispatched American troops on training missions to allied militaries there.  During more than 40 such operations with names like Eager Lion and Friendship Two that sometimes lasted for weeks or months at a time, they taught Middle Eastern security forces the finer points of counterinsurgency, small unit tactics, intelligence gathering, and information operations -- skills crucial to defeating popular uprisings...
Now, what exactly is up with that? Should we be applying our standard left-paranoid analysis to this? I.e., (1) the interests of our ruling class, the 1% if you like, are aligned with those of the familiar dictators Ben Ali and Mubarak and so on; (2) the U.S. government, as the "management committee of the bourgeoisie" or agency for carrying out ruling class interests, inevitably opposes the democratic revolutions; and (3) Obama does his job of expressing the natural pro-revolutionary sentiments of the 99% to distract us from what is really happening.

But I'd like to sketch out an alternative way of looking at it that might be a little less boring and a little smarter, and still "of the left"--and indeed the seeds of a whole bigfat theory of democracy and power.


Benevolent dictator Wotan figures it out: God can't give people free will, they have to take it. But won't that make trouble for the government? Hey, kid, why do you think they call it Götterdämmerung?